
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24.150 Liberalism, Toleration, and Freedom of Speech, Fall 2023

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COHEN v. CALIFORNIA O. 29 Opinion of the Court COHEN v. CALIFORNIA Cal. I COHEN v. CALIFORNIA Cal. I APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA, SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT No. 299. Argued February 22, 1971—Decided June 7, 1971 Appellant was convicted of violating that part of Cal. Penal Code § 415 which prohibits "maliciously and willfully disturb[ing] the peace or quiet of any neighborhood or person . . . by . . . offensive conduct," for wearing a jacket bearing the words "Fuck the Draft" in a corridor of the Los Angeles Courthouse. The Court of Appeal held that "offensive conduct" means "behavior which has a tendency to provoke others to acts of violence or to in turn disturb the peace," and affirmed the conviction. Held: Absent a

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Harlan's Holmesian moment in Cohen:

'To many, the immediate consequence of this freedom may often appear to be only verbal tumult, discord, and even offensive utterance. These are, however, within established limits, in truth necessary side effects of the broader enduring values which the process of open debate permits us to achieve. That the air may at times seem filled with verbal cacophony is, in this sense not a sign of weakness but of strength.'

From "Paul Robert Cohen, Appellant, v. State of California (1971)." This text is in the public domain.

but what if wealthy corporations fill the air with verbal cacophony?

A warm-up hypothetical case


City Council is considering a law banning 41+ hour work weeks.

Worker Willie supports it, Daddy Warbucks opposes.

Warbucks, being rich, pays for 10,000 pamphlets explaining the dangers of the law. Willie, being poor, can only explain the benefits to people he sees on the T.

As a result, the law fails.

Would a law limiting how many pamphlets Warbucks can distribute be okay?



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Public Law 107-155 107th Congress

An Act

To amend the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 to provide bipartisan campaign

Mar. 27, 2002 [H.R. 2356]

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

(a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the "Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002".

(b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents of this Act

is as follows:

Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002. 2 USC 431 note.

SEC. 203. PROHIBITION OF CORPORATE AND LABOR DISBURSEMENTS FOR ELECTIONEERING COMMUNICATIONS.

(a) In General.—Section 316(b)(2) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 441b(b)(2)) is amended by inserting "or for any applicable electioneering communication" before ", but shall not include".

From "Public Law 107–155–MAR. 27, 2002." This text is in the public domain ${\color{black}\bullet}$



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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BOYcM1z5fTs

1a. Why does Stevens say that 'restrictions on [corporate] electioneering are less likely to encroach upon First Amendment freedoms'?

Former President Barack Obama on the ruling:

'We don't need to give any more voice to the powerful interests that already drown out the voices of everyday Americans.'

Opinion of STEVENS, J.

1. Antidistortion

The fact that corporations are different from human beings might seem to need no elaboration, except that the majority opinion almost completely elides it. Austin set forth some of the basic differences. Unlike natural persons, corporations have "limited liability" for their owners and managers, "perpetual life," separation of ownership and control, "and favorable treatment of the accumulation and distribution of assets . . . that enhance their ability to attract capital and to deploy their resources in ways that maximize the return on their shareholders' investments." 494 U.S., at 658-659. Unlike voters in U.S. elections, corporations may be foreign controlled.70 Unlike other interest groups, business corporations have been "effectively delegated responsibility for ensuring society's economic welfare";71 they inescapably structure the life of every citizen. "'[T]he resources in the treasury of a business corporation," furthermore, "'are not an indication of popular support for the corporation's political ideas." Id., at 659 (quoting MCFL, 479 U.S., at 258). "They reflect instead the economically motivated decisions of investors and customers. The availability of these resources may

make a corporation a formidable political presence, even though the power of the corporation may be no reflection of the power of its ideas." 494 U.S., at 659 (quoting *MCFL*, 479 U.S., at 258).⁷²

It might also be added that corporations have no consciences, no beliefs, no feelings, no thoughts, no desires. Corporations help structure and facilitate the activities of human beings, to be sure, and their "personhood" often serves as a useful legal fiction. But they are not themselves members of "We the People" by whom and for whom our Constitution was established.

These basic points help explain why corporate election-eering is not only more likely to impair compelling governmental interests, but also why restrictions on that electioneering are less likely to encroach upon First Amendment freedoms. One fundamental concern of the First Amendment is to "protec[t] the individual's interest in self-expression." Consolidated Edison Co. of N. Y. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N. Y., 447 U. S. 530, 534, n. 2 (1980); see also Bellotti, 435 U. S., at 777, n. 12. Freedom of speech helps "make men free to develop their faculties," Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis,

From "Opinion of Stevens, J.: Citizens United, Appellant, v. Federal Election Commission (2010)." This text is in the public domain.

It is an interesting question "who" is even speaking when a business corporation places an advertisement that endorses or attacks a particular candidate. Presumably it is not the customers or employees, who typically have no say in such matters. It cannot realistically be said to be the shareholders, who tend to be far removed from the day-to-day decisions of the firm and whose political preferences may be opaque to management. Perhaps the officers or directors of the corporation have the best claim to be the ones speaking, except their fiduciary duties generally prohibit them from using corporate funds for personal ends. Some individuals associated with the corporation must make the decision to place the ad, but the idea that these individuals are thereby fostering their selfexpression or cultivating their critical faculties is fanciful. It is entirely possible that the corporation's electoral message will conflict with their personal convictions. Take away the ability to use general treasury funds for some of those ads, and no one's autonomy, dignity, or political equality has been impinged upon in the least.

From "Opinion of Stevens, J.: Citizens United, Appellant, v. Federal Election Commission (2010)." This text is in

J., concurring), it respects their "dignity and choice," Cohen v. California, 403 U. S. 15, 24 (1971), and it facilitates the value of "individual self-realization," Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 591, 594 (1982). Corporate speech, however, is derivative speech, speech by proxy. A regulation such as BCRA §203 may affect the way in which individuals disseminate certain messages through the corporate form, but it does not prevent anyone from speaking in his or her own voice. "Within the realm of [campaign spending] generally," corporate spending is "furthest from the core of political expression." Beaumont, 539 U. S., at 161, n. 8.


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1b. Is there an important difference here between media corporations (e.g. the *New York Times*) and others? What does Abrams think?

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Abrams



Floyd Abrams (born in July 9, 1939) is an American lawyer. A member of Cahill Gordon & Reindel, he has argued in 13 cases before the Supreme Court of the United States. Abrams represented The New York Times in 1972 during the Pentagon Papers case, Judith Miller in the CIA leak grand July investigation, Standard & Poor's and Lorillard Tobacco Company. He also argued for Citizens United Buring the 2010 Supreme Court cape III

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Abrams, Floyd. The Soul of the First Amendment. Yale University Press, 2018. © Yale University Press All rights reserved. This content is excluded from our Creative Commons license. For more information, see https://joxw.mit.edu/help/faq-fair-use/. In *Mills v. Alabama*, SC "held unconstitutional a state statue that...had applied to the press a law that barred on election day only 'any electioneering'";

the Court held 'that no statute could limit, even for a day, what the press printed about an election, however unfair its coverage or how great the impact of its publication.'

Abrams, Floyd. From Chapter 5 in *The Soul of the First Amendment*. Yale University Press, 2018. © Yale University Press. All rights reserved. This content is excluded from our Creative Commons license. For more information. see https://dox.mit.edu/hei/fad-afair-use/

In another press-freedom case, *Miami Herald Publishing Co.* v. *Tornillo*, decided in 1974, the Court, again unanimously, determined that a Florida law that required newspapers that had criticized political candidates to provide equal space for responses was facially inconsistent with the First Amendment.

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In both cases, the Court rejected out-of-hand the argument that freedom of expression could be limited in the name of democracy. In both, it seemed so obvious to the Court—both rulings were unanimous—that either legislatively limiting what the press could say or requiring it to say things it chose not to was so inherently *undemocratic* that doing so could not possibly be deemed consistent with the First Amendment.

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[Summarizing one thread]:

- 1A forbids regulating who may speak; no law could make it harder for blue-eyed people to express their views.
- 1A requires allowing some corporations to speak (close to elections etc), e.g. newspapers.
- So 1A requires allowing all to.

an earlier case



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303 creative.

home about creativity kudos contact

my story. meet lorie.

background

For over a decade, I've had the privileged of working in a variety of environments providing marketing advertising, graphic design, branding, strategy, and social media consultation services to businesses and organizations large and small. The opportunity to do so in the private, public, and small business world has allowed me to learn and gain insight. My specialties are many and large scale because I truly love

why I create

As a Christian who believes that God gave me the creative aifts that are expressed through this business I have always strived to honor Him in how I operate it. My primary objective is to design and create expressive content—script, graphics, websites, and other creative content—to convey the most compelling and effective message I can to promote my client's purposes, goals, services, products, events causes, or values. Because of my faith, however, I am selective about the messages that I create or promote - while I will serve anyone I am always careful to avoid communicating ideas or messages, o promoting events, products, services, or organizations, that are inconsistent with my religious beliefs.



and anything involving a glue gun. I am a native to colorful Colorado, hence the name for her company...303 being the local area code for the Deguer Metro grea-

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
The First Amendment

'Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.'

Note: now interpreted to mean no government agent (President as well as Congress; state and local as well as federal) may act so as to 'abridge the freedom' etc.







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2. What, according to the 303 majority opinion, is the difference between the Tenth Circuit's legal reasoning and the argument Colorado presented to the Supreme Court?

Tenth Circuit

The court acknowledged that Ms. Smith's planned wedding websites qualify as 'pure speech' protected by the First Amendment...As a result, the court reasoned, Colorado had to satisfy strict scrutiny before compelling speech from her that she did not wish to create...Under that standard, the court continued, the State had to show both that forcing Ms. Smith to create speech would serve a compelling governmental interest and that no less restrictive alternative exists to secure that interest...As the majority saw it, Colorado has a compelling interest in ensuring equal access to publicly available goods and services, and no option short of coercing speech from Ms. Smith can satisfy that interest because she plans to offer unique services' that are, by definition, unavailable elsewhere.'

Colorado

Now, the State seems to acknowledge that the First Amendment does forbid it from coercing Ms. Smith to create websites endorsing same-sex marriage or expressing any other message with which she disagree...Instead, Colorado devotes most of its efforts to advancing an alternative theory for affirmance.

The State's alternative theory runs this way. To comply with Colorado law, the State says, all Ms. Smith must do is repurpose websites she will create to celebrate marriages she *does* endorse for marriages she does *not*.

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She sells a product to some, the State reasons, so she must sell the same product to all...At bottom, Colorado's theory rests on a belief that the Tenth Circuit erred at the outset when it said this case implicates pure speech...Instead, Colorado says, this case involves only the sale of an ordinary commercial product and any burden on Ms. Smith's speech is purely 'incidental.' ...On the State's telling, then, speech more or less vanishes from the picture—and, with it, any need for First Amendment scrutiny. In places, the dissent seems to advance the same line of argument. *Post*, at 29 (opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.).

From "303 Creative LLC et al. v. Elenis et al. (2022)." This text is in the public domain.

But where is this dignity found today for gay Americans? Where is this dignity found in the Supreme Court's 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis case? It is utterly absent in the majority opinion. The opinion found that Lorie Smith, owner of 303 Creative, a Colorado website design company, has the right to deny some of her services to gay couples. In other words, the First Amendment can be a shielding blanket for discrimination — but only discrimination toward gay Americans. The Court does not explicitly strike down the law central to this case, the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act, but rather prohibits the state from justly enforcing it. Practically, this opinion claims that states may have laws prohibiting discrimination; they just may not, in certain circumstances, utilize them to protect gay people. No such dignity can be found here.

Layne, Joshua, From "From Precedent to Prejudice: The Supreme Court's Misstep in 303 Creative v. Elenis." Harvard Political Review, September 17, 2023. © Harvard Political Review. All rights reserved. This content is excluded from our Creative Commons license. For more information, see https://oxw.mit.edu/help/faq-fair-use/.



From Precedent to Prejudice: The Supreme Court's Misstep in 303 Creative v. Elenis

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Gorsuch Ruling

CADA prohibits all "public accommodations" from denying "the full and equal enjoyment" of its goods and services to any customer based on his race, creed, disability, sexual orientation, or other statutorily enumerated trait. Colo. Rev. Stat. §24–34–601(2)(a).

Held: The First Amendment prohibits Colorado from forcing a website designer to create expressive designs speaking messages with which the designer disagrees. Pp. 6–26.

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Compelled Speech precedents

Compelled Speech precedents

In *Barnette...*the Court faced an effort by the State of West Virginia to force schoolchildren to salute the Nation's flag and recite the Pledge of Allegiance. ... Some families objected on the ground that the State sought to compel their children to express views at odds with their faith as Jehovah's Witnesses.

From "303 Creative LLC et al. v. Elenis et al. (2022)." This text is in the public domain.

(This was ruled unconstitutional under 1A.)

In Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc....veterans organizing a St. Patrick's Day parade in Boston refused to include a group of gay, lesbian, and bisexual individuals in their event. The group argued that Massachusetts's public accommodations statute entitled it to participate in the parade.

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Compelled Speech precedents

Sotomayor, dissenting

[But under 1A] the parade was constitutionally protected speech and requiring the veterans to include voices they wished to exclude would impermissibly require them to 'alter the expressive content of their parade.'

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The law applies only to status-based refusals to provide the full and equal enjoyment of whatever services petitioners choose to sell to the public.

From "303 Creative LLC et al. v. Elenis et al. (2022)." This text is in the public domain.

Colorado does not require the company to 'speak [the State's] preferred message.'...Nor does it prohibit the company from speaking the company's preferred message. The company could, for example, offer only wedding websites with biblical quotations describing marriage as between one man and one woman....All the company has to do is offer its services without regard to customers' protected characteristics. ...Any effect on the company's speech is therefore 'incidental' to the State's content-neutral regulation of conduct.

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
Once these features of the law are understood, it becomes clear that petitioners' freedom of speech is not abridged in any meaningful sense, factual or legal.

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
What do you think?

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next time



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